Role of the Rajya Sabha in Federal Legislative Scrutiny
Keywords:
Rajya Sabha, bicameralism, federalism, legislative scrutiny, standing committees, Indian ParliamentAbstract
The Rajya Sabha, the Council of States, is the upper chamber of the Indian Parliament and the principal institutional expression of the federal character of the Union. Its legitimacy rests on representation of the States rather than the electorate, and its legislative role is to review, revise, and, where necessary, delay bills passed by the directly elected Lok Sabha. This paper examines how the Rajya Sabha performs that scrutiny function in practice. It combines a doctrinal review of the constitutional provisions governing bicameral passage with an empirical analysis of 412 ordinary bills passed by the Lok Sabha during the 14th to 16th Lok Sabha terms (2004–2019). Bills were coded for whether they were referred to a standing committee, whether the Rajya Sabha proposed amendments, whether the Lok Sabha accepted them, the type of amendment, and the number of days the Rajya Sabha took to return the bill. The Rajya Sabha amended 97 bills (23.5%), and the Lok Sabha accepted 61 of those amendments (62.9%). Committee referral was the strongest correlate of amendment: 49.2% of referred bills were amended, compared with 13.3% of bills not referred (χ²(1) = 60.25, p < 0.001). Referred bills also took substantially longer to clear the upper house (M = 71.4 days versus 22.9 days; t = 17.82, p < 0.001). Lok Sabha term had no significant association with amendment rates (χ²(2) = 4.00, p = 0.135). The findings suggest that the Rajya Sabha’s scrutiny is concentrated on bills that receive detailed committee examination, and that its revisions are largely technical and procedural rather than structural.References
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